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The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic 
Revivalism in Nigeria 
Abimbola Adesoji 
Abstract: From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram up-
rising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating 
human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was 
significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the at-
tempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic 
religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of 
Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, 
the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation 
in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated despera-
tion of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal 
Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, 
either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. 
These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around 
the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evi-
denced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian 
state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This 
paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links 
with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the 
secularity of the Nigerian state. 
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The outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria in July 2009 marked 
yet another phase in the recurring pattern that violent uprisings, riots and 
disturbances have become in Nigeria. Given the heterogeneous nature of 
Nigerian society, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, and the prolonged 
military rule that ended with the advent of civil rule in 1999, (but during 
which a significant section of the society was highly militarized), the situa-
tion could perhaps not have been different. But what is alarming is the 
forceful attempt by Islamic fundamentalists to impose a religious ideology 
on a constitutionally recognized secular society.1 Obviously a manifestation 
of the growing religious sensitivity and ineffective deterrence measures in the 
past, the effects of the riots on the country are legion. Aside from the con-
tinued loss of lives and property, the growing fear and animosities among Ni-
gerians, particularly about the threatened secularity of the Nigerian state, and 
the likelihood of recurrence given the growing religious revivalism around 
the world are enough justification for a careful consideration and documen-
tation of the phenomenon that the Boko Haram uprising represents.  
The Boko Haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose 
a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, but like the first major 
attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts, it widened the scope of the 
efforts at Islamic revivalism. More significantly, despite the brutal suppres-
sion of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko Haram soldiers, the 
spread and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of its leader-
ship – and perhaps its membership – that it could successfully engage a 
modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to the 
cause. Yet, the Boko Haram uprising attracted attention not only because 
the legitimacy of a state was challenged in the course of promoting Islamic 
revivalism, but also because its outbreak was an indictment of the state, 
whose seeming ineptitude was becoming apparent with regular outbreaks of 
violence of many kinds despite the state’s continuous promises to check them. 
The Boko Haram Uprising: Building on Precedents 
The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 
1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi, obviously the first attempts at imposing a 
religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, marked the beginning 
of ferocious conflict and crises in Nigeria (Isichei 1987: 194-208; Ibrahim 1997: 
511-512). Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, were several 
1   Part II Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution states expressly that “the Government 
of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion” (see 
<http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>).  The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria  97 
other crises. These include the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the 
Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the 
nationwide crisis over Nigeria’s membership in the Organisation of the Is-
lamic Conference in January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/ 
Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 
1988, the acrimonious, nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the 
Constituent Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University 
crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot 
of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil distur-
bance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 1994 (Imo 1995: 21-23; 
Ibrahim 1997: 512-516; Enwerem 1999: 124). Similarly, between 1999 and 
2008, 28 other conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Sha-
gamu conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crises of 2001, 2002, 2004 
and 2008 (Omipidan 2009: 5-6; Akaeze 2009). The crisis recurred in January 
2010.  
Virtually all these crises, many of which took a violent form, have been 
explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where the crisis was not 
borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some groups, prevent them 
from being a security threat, or contain their spread – as was the case with 
the Maitatsine riots (Albert 1999a: 285-286; Ladan 1999: 101) – it arose out 
of the conversion driven by one religious group and the resistance by an-
other religious group of its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the 
Kano riot of 1991 during which Muslims complained of preferential treat-
ment in the approval of conduct of a religious crusade by Christians and the 
use of Kano Race Course earlier not approved for Muslims to hold a similar 
programme (Albert 1999a: 291-292; Williams 1997: 33-49). In some other 
cases, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler problem that was at 
its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises fall into this cate-
gory (Nwosu 1996: 141-152; Williams 1999; Ibrahim 1998: 39-66; Uchendu 
2004: 132-144; Human Rights Watch 2005: 7-10). Although almost all the 
crises have been subsumed under religion and explained by even some au-
thors as religious factors, it is apparent that other extraneous and underlying 
factors like economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths 
(who easily became willing tools in the hand of patrons), and the unhealthy 
contest for political offices have all played parts (Ibrahim 1997: 521-524; 
Human Rights Watch 2005: 48; Sulaiman 2008: 20-26). The assertion of 
Ibrahim, corroborated by Ladan, that all ethno-religious crises have behind 
them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups, 
is quite accurate in this case (Ibrahim 1998: 51; Ladan 1999: 105). 
Specifically, the Maitatsine uprisings – to which those of Boko Haram 
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and armed resistance, and modus operandi – have generally been explained 
by a combination of factors like economic dislocation, deprivation, and 
income inequalities, as well as poverty aided by local disasters like drought 
and a rinderpest (cattle plague) pandemic, all with links to Islam. Other 
contributing factors were the rejection of the secular nature of the Nigerian 
society and the impact of the success of the 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini 
revolution in Iran (Hickey 1984: 251-256; Lubeck 1985: 369-390; Hiskett 
1987: 209-223; Usman 1987: 11-25; Isichei 1987: 194-208; Clarke 1987: 93-
115; Kastfelt 1989: 83-90; Ibrahim 1997: 509-534; Albert 1997: 285-325; 
Falola 1998: 137-162; Albert 1999a: 274-309; 1999b: 19-36; Stock 2004: 415-
417). Significantly, many of the explanations offered for the outbreak of the 
Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s are relevant to the Boko Haram uprising. 
The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism
The Boko Haram riots lasted from 25 July to 30 July 2009 and spread across 
the four states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno, the latter of which saw 
the most extensive rioting perhaps because it was the leader of the move-
ment’s base. The immediate cause of the riot was the sacking of the sect’s 
hideout at the Dutsen Tanshi area of Bauchi on 26 July 2009 by a joint secu-
rity team, during which nine of its members were arrested and materials for 
making bombs and other weapons confiscated. This led to reprisal attacks 
two hours later by the sect members on police formations in Bauchi and 
eventually in the other three states (Bakare, Adedeji and Shobiye 2009: 5; 
Owuamanam, Falola and Shobiye 2009: 2-3; McConnell 2009; Hines 2009). 
The riot was eventually quelled after the capture and killing – supposedly in 
police custody – of its leader, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, and a fierce battle 
with his followers, some of whom were arrested (Adedeji 2009; McConnell 
2009). It is estimated that over 700 people, mostly sect members, were 
killed, and public buildings like police stations, prisons, government offices, 
schools and churches were destroyed (Nwankwo and Falola 2009: 2; Oyeg-
bile and Lawal 2009: 67-71). 
With the death of its leader and known sponsor Alhaji Buji Foi and the 
scattering of its members, and in the absence of any official report so far, it 
is difficult to obtain precise information on the sect. From what is available, 
however, it would appear that the group has been around for some time, as 
long as ten or fifteen years, and had operated under different names in the 
past. Such names included Ahlusunna wal’ Jamma Hijra; the Nigerian Taliban; 
and the Yusufiyya (Fasure 2009: 2; Omipidan 2009b: 48; Sunday Tribune 
2009). Indeed, its leader Yusuf claimed to be part of the Shiites under the 
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Jama’atul Tajdidi Islam (JTI) of Abubakar Mujahid broke away from the Shi-
ites in the 1990s, Yusuf also became a member of the JTI and was even the 
amir (leader) of JTI for Borno State (Suleiman 2009: 19-23). The Shiites, also 
known as the Islamic Society of Nigeria, emerged in Nigeria in the late 
1970s under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky. Its objective is the 
establishment of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia through preaching 
and subtle influence on society. It also sympathizes with the state of Pales-
tine and abhors Israel and the United States of America. The Shiites did not 
hide their disdain for the state police and the judiciary, both of which it 
considers instruments of Satan (Olugboji 1995:6). Although this sect is elitist 
and appears less dangerous than either the Maitatsine or the Boko Haram 
movements, its goal is revolutionary/reformist and its members could resort 
to carrying arms or engaging in armed conflict if the sect’s present strategies 
of preaching and exerting subtle influence on society do not work. Its pre-
disposition to violence, even when not professed, and as seen in its clashes 
with other Islamic groups, is pertinent. For instance, the Shiites engaged 
their breakaway group, the Yan Tauri – and other Muslims it considered 
liberal – in violent confrontation in 1996 and 1997, among other instances. 
Also, the Shiites’ regular clashing with policemen during their processions 
and anti-West protests is an indicator of what the group is capable of (Albert 
1999a: 286-288; Akhaine and Abuah 2009: 1-2).  
Yusuf’s revolutionary transformation, borne out of his long-term dream 
of reforming society, could explain the radicalization of the group under his 
leadership, the group having assumed a hard-line position after its erstwhile 
leader, Abubakar Lawal, left to study at the University of Medina, Saudi 
Arabia (Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 68). A different claim was that Yusuf left 
the Taliban because of its extremist tendencies but vowed that his group 
would not relent until an “independent and a just State devoid of anything 
haram (ungodly or sinful) had been established” (Omipidan 2009a: 43-44). It 
would appear that Yusuf prepared himself for the leadership role that he 
later played in the Boko Haram sect with his membership in other 
fundamentalist groups. It is also not impossible that the Boko Haram sect 
was just one facet of the multifaceted and well-linked fundamentalist 
movement, the true extent of which has yet to be fully determined. The 
reason that Yusuf decided to sever his ties with the Taliban – if in fact, he 
actually did – could have been informed not by his opposition to their ex-
tremist tendencies but rather by his desire to realize his long-term dream of 
reform, which, perhaps, was being slowed down by others who were not as 
passionate as he was. 
It seems that the group might not have explicitly given the name “Boko 
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basic beliefs: “Boko Haram” is derived from a combination of the Hausa 
word boko meaning “book” and the Arabic word haram which is something 
forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Literally, it means “book is sinful”, but its 
deeper meaning is that Western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly 
and should therefore be forbidden. Characteristically, the sect not only op-
posed but outrightly rejected Western education, Western culture and mod-
ern science. Alternatively, it embraced and advocated the propagation of and 
strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone’s personal 
wishes. In line with this objective, the sect sought to impose Sharia across all 
Nigerian states (Bumah and Adelakun 2009: 40; National Life 2009). Ironi-
cally, Yusuf, the sect leader, enjoyed the best that Western technology of-
fered in the form of exotic cars, the latest communication equipment and 
the best medical services. In addition, his desire to fully prepare for his jihad 
encouraged his sending people abroad for medical training, a development 
that alienated some of his members (Madunagu, Shobiye and Chiedozie 
2009: 2). The sect’s membership cut across the broad spectrum of society, 
but a preponderant number of members came from its poorest groups. 
Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, a former com-
missioner and other officers of Borno State, membership extended to drug 
addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people. Although the common 
denominator among all members was their desire to overthrow the secular 
government and to propagate Islamic law, the oratory prowess of Yusuf 
arguably contributed to their mobilization and participation (Michael and 
Bwala 2009: 3; Omipidan 2009a: 43-44; Olu 2009: 9). 
The wide gap in time notwithstanding, the socio-economic conditions 
that sustained the Maitatsine uprisings in 1980 are relevant to the Boko 
Haram situation. In some cases, the situations had got worse: There was 
mass poverty; inequality in educational, political and employment opportu-
nities; ignorance due to limited educational opportunities; growing unem-
ployment; and governmental corruption, including the misuse of resources, 
by which the people were repulsed (Usman 1987: 21; Enwerem 1999: 125; 
Ale 2009: 8). These problems swelled the army of vulnerable people whose 
disillusionment and impoverishment made them easy prey in the hands of a 
demagogue like Yusuf. In particular, with the notorious corruption among 
the political elite, the country’s vast wealth has failed to improve the lives of 
citizens. This, coupled with stolen election mandates, has led to a growing 
disenchantment with the Western system of governance, particularly among 
jobless young men (McConnell 2009). The London Times saw the uprising as 
a symptom of the social breakdown that has made Nigeria so prone to vio-
lence (Anonymous 2009). Interestingly, fanatical uprisings have mostly origi-
nated in the North, arguably the poorest part of the country (Ibelema 2009:  The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria  101 
18; Makinde 2009: 6). Indeed, out of the 178 clashes that have taken place in 
Northern Nigeria between 1980 and 2004, 104 were related to religion (Sani 
2007).  
Although there is no conclusive link with jihadist movements outside 
Nigeria, the modus operandi of the sect, fashioned after the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan, has generated some curiosities. Given its large following and the 
claim that it had sent members to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, 
Mauritania and Algeria for training, it could be that the Boko Haram mod-
elled itself after the Taliban simply to acknowledge its source of inspiration. 
It could also be that it was meant to attract sympathy and support from the 
Taliban or related groups. Viewed from another perspective, it could also be 
that the links actually exist but have not been conclusively proven. The loud 
speculation in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such 
groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, 
Tablighi clerics from Pakistan, and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia 
in Northern Nigeria, as well as the reported training of some fundamental-
ists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign countries, offer proof of Boko 
Haram’s links with fundamentalist groups around the world, however tenu-
ous (Alli 2009: 1, 8; Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 69; Soboyede 2009: 14; Clay-
ton 2010).  
But there was financial support for the sect also from within Nigeria. 
Although many of them are not yet known, the support of Alhaji Buji Foi, a 
former commissioner in Borno State, is commonly acknowledged. There 
were also other speculated sponsors, from prominent religious leaders to 
businessmen from the North. Motivations for such support could include 
belief in the sect’s cause, desire to promote religion, or sowing the seeds for 
future reciprocity of goodwill. The givers could also be disciples, admirers, 
partners or associates of Yusuf. They could also be underestimating the 
potential ramifications of the sect’s agenda (although that is doubtful), but 
through their support, they became part of the Islamist agenda to launch a 
revolution that would entrench Islamic doctrines and practices in Nigeria 
like the jihadist organizations outside the country.  
The role that partisan politics and political patronage play in the suste-
nance of the sect is obvious. It would appear that the introduction of Sharia 
in some Northern states beginning in 1999 encouraged closeness between 
Yusuf and some of the ruling and/or aspiring politicians as their decision 
aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to Islamic law. But he was 
perhaps disappointed by the type of Sharia that was introduced across some 
Northern states that fell short of his standards. He may have believed either 
that the office-holders were not serious Muslims or that their Western edu-
cation was hindering or limiting their commitment. In addition, his fraterni- 102 Abimbola Adesoji 
zation with the political class possibly informed his willingness to use his 
group to assist the political elite to secure political power that would, in turn, 
be used to protect and possibly advance his career (Omipidan 2009a: 44). 
The disappointment he felt following his abandonment by the political elite 
could have hastened his desire to effect a change through violence. Another 
dimension could be the failure to attach the Sharia-based law to social wel-
fare schemes – with the dividends of Sharia seemingly not forthcoming, 
radicals thus had the opportunity to step in and demand a fully beneficial 
Islamic state (McConnell 2009). When the fact that the Maitatsine riots 
broke out during the tenure of a civilian president in 1980 is considered, the 
link to Yusuf’s rise to political patronage could be understood. The thesis 
that politicians who patronize religious leaders, either for support or protec-
tive charms, use them as a tool and later discard them or unleash them on 
innocent people best describes Yusuf’s situation (Adam al Ilory 2009: 23). 
Most of those who backed violent and revolutionary sects were politicians 
who needed the sect members’ violent disposition to achieve their political 
and, by extension, economic ends (Muogbo 2009). 
Concluding Notes 
Given its abhorrence of the evil that Western civilization and its products 
represent, and given its strong commitment to the promotion of conserva-
tive Islam, whose agenda constitutes a threat to the corporate existence of 
the secular Nigerian state, a clash was inevitable. As a group that desired to 
facilitate change by any means possible, Boko Haram’s acknowledgement of 
and actual use of violence became a foregone conclusion. Beyond being an 
organization with elaborate plans, the intensity, spread and gallantry of the 
sect members serve as evidence of their remarkable commitment to their 
cause. Buji Foi selling his properties and donating the proceeds to the sect 
was the height of his commitment to the cause (Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 
71). But it also shows the hollowness and the futility of implementing a 
religious agenda and engaging a modern state in combat or warfare, particu-
larly when the means are limited and the level of support is low. In June 
2009, some Boko Haram members who were travelling for a funeral had a 
clash with some policemen over the wearing of crash helmets. During the 
clash, some of them were killed, and Mohammed Yusuf responded by 
openly swearing revenge and vowing that nothing would dissuade him in his 
goals (McConnell 2009). Whereas the strength of the organization and the 
level of internal and external support could have informed this open chal-
lenge to a legally constituted government, the support was just not there, or 
it simply fizzled out when the chips were down. The denouncement of Yusuf  The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria  103 
by mainstream Islam is pertinent. Mainstream Islam’s ambivalence, accord-
ing to Hickey (1984: 254), was caused by the vague or ambivalent attitude of 
some vocal elements within Islam who, though they would not actively 
embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or 
only feebly condemned it. The ambivalence was not due to mainstream 
Islam’s lack of belief in the fundamentalists’ position or ultimate aims, but 
rather due to differing opinions on the method of carrying out those aims. 
Although the adoption of Sharia by twelve Northern states (beginning 
in 1999) appeared to pacify some conservative elements within Islam – 
contrary to Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, which clearly defines the 
secularity of the Nigerian state) – its limited application was still condemned 
by the Boko Haram sect, which criticized the governors for their insincerity 
and for politicizing Sharia. This explains why the full implementation of 
Sharia not only in the North but in the whole of the country was the adver-
tised cause of the jihad. Viewed from a broader perspective, the adoption of 
Sharia appeared to be an effort to pacify a section of Muslims who had con-
sistently agitated against the secular nature of the country and who perhaps 
were seen either as a threat to the tenure of the political office-holders or as 
a support base that could not be neglected on the basis of political calcula-
tion. The undue emphasis on religion as a basis for differentiation and mo-
bilization accounts for this, but the measure appeared not strong enough to 
appease these vocal but loose elements. The conservatives insist on a unitary 
view of society that recognizes no difference between state and religion, and 
they advocate making Nigeria an Islamic state administered according to the 
principles of Sharia law. For them, all Muslims belong to the umma (com-
munity), and the idea of a secular state is atheistic or syncretistic. Apart from 
challenging the Muslim affirmation of religious principles – especially the 
Sharia – the imposition of secularity, according to them, amounts to a cul-
tural affront to a significant portion of the population and reduces them to 
the status of second-class citizens. Although this view is claimed to be a 
Quranic injunction, it does not enjoy popular acceptance among liberal 
Muslims who maintain that such a view does not imply the need for the 
Islamization of Nigeria nor does it endorse non-acceptance of the constitu-
tional provision of the secularity of the state (Imo 1995: 58-59; Ibrahim 
1998: 39-66; Ilesanmi 2001: 529-554) 
One major factor in the recurrence of religious uprisings in Nigeria is 
the inability (or, perhaps, reluctance) of the government to deal decisively 
with past occurrences and the dramatis personae, including their backers. Im-
plicitly, it would appear that once a culprit or a sect member avoids being 
killed during the suppression of their insurrection, it is all but sure that he 
will take part in the next one, all other things being equal. This non-deter- 104 Abimbola Adesoji 
rence has arguably encouraged a culture of impunity and promoted a circle 
of violence, hence the recurrent nature of religion-related crises in Nigeria. 
The Kala Kato riot of December 2009 is a pertinent example: Mallam Sale 
Badamasi, Kala Kato’s leader, had criticized the unjust killing of Boko 
Haram members for preaching against what they considered to be the reality 
of religious permissiveness and laxity, particularly among those considered 
to be leaders (Abubakar and Mohammed 2010; Michael 2010: 13). Indeed, 
what could not be conclusively proved is if the Kala Kato riot was a con-
tinuation of the Boko Haram riot, a resurgence of the Maitatsine movement 
of the 1980s, or perhaps another face of the hydra-headed monster that 
Islamic extremism is gradually assuming in Nigeria. 
The growing problem of Islamic fundamentalism appears to be more 
deep-rooted than the approaches adopted by the Nigerian government to 
address it. Given the danger it poses to the country and global security, and 
given the more serious response by nations around the world to terrorism-
related events, comprehensive and drastic measures that aim to address the 
root causes should be fashioned. Wishing the problem away, pretending it is 
not there, or that it is not as serious as it is, is akin to sitting on a time bomb. 
The recurrent nature of intra and inter-ethnic religious crises with ethnic 
angles is a timely warning. 
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Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und die Wiederbelebung des Islam  
in Nigeria 
Zusammenfassung: Vom Maitatsine-Aufstand 1980 bis zu den Boko-Ha-
ram-Unruhen 2009 hat die nigerianische Bevölkerung unter den verheeren-
den menschlichen und materiellen Kosten ethnisch-religiöser Konflikte 
gelitten. Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen (Juli 2009) markierten allerdings eine 
qualitative Veränderung, denn sie stellten einen Präzedenzfall dar und ver-
stärkten Versuche konservativer Anhänger des Islam, im säkularen nigeriani-
schen Staat Elemente islamischer Ideologie einzuführen. Angesichts der 
Empfänglichkeit der Nigerianer für religiöses Denken konnte sich die Boko-
Haram-Sekte schnell ausbreiten, erleichtert durch die nach wie vor beste-
hende ökonomische Polarisierung der nigerianischen Gesellschaft, die er-
neut heftig aufgebrochene Konkurrenz der Parteien um die politische Macht 
und die Ambivalenz einiger lautstarker islamischer Führer, die zwar nicht 
explizit zum Aufstand aufriefen, aber auch nichts zur Beendigung der Hetze 
beitrugen und diese nur vorsichtig verurteilten. Diese internen Faktoren und 
der gleichzeitige weltweite Aufschwung des islamischen Fundamentalismus 
führten in der hoch volatilen nigerianischen Gesellschaft zu den gewaltsam 
ausgetragenen Boko-Haram-Unruhen. Die im nigerianischen Staat struktu-
rell angelegte Gefahr religiöser Auseinandersetzungen legt nahe, dass solche 
Gewaltausbrüche ein immer wiederkehrendes Problem bleiben könnten. 
Der vorliegende Beitrag dokumentiert und analysiert die Boko-Haram-Un-
ruhen und skizziert ihre Bedeutung für die Wiederbelebung des politischen 
Islam und die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen für den säkularen 
nigerianischen Staat. 
Schlagwörter: Nigeria, Aufstand/Revolte, Islam, Islamisches Recht 